So the Apollo program , which I'm sure we'll talk about in a minute, was pretty top-down by Kennedy and the gang.
This is for the Apollo program .
So unlike the Apollo Program , where we were really clueless about the moon, we were all over the place, but only on the near side.
Going from the Apollo program , grand national infrastructure projects, really big thinking about the world and the future to paying other countries and companies to fly stuff
that we did have with the Apollo program had it been done in such a linear and boring way as we do policy today.
similar uh that we did with the Apollo program you don't want to just go once you want to go multiple times and if
And that's what we did have with the Apollo program .
That's something we've learned from NASA and the Apollo Program .
Two of the most obvious are the Manhattan Project and the Apollo program to land men on the moon.
And so what we've seen since, the Apollo program is the opposite, like a whole outsourcing of the public brain to the private sector so that the actual dynamic
But we haven't taken a bold step like we did in the Apollo program and decided to let's just go to Mars.
trudge back to the habitat for safety uh these are all early things that the Apollo program ran into as well because
Like, just to give an example-- the Apollo program , very sort of top down effort.
I think probably the really interesting thing about the history is that the Apollo program was really a surrogate national security effort, that the Soviets and the United
Male #3: It's been 40 years since the heyday of the Apollo program .
And one of the stories I tell that happened with the Apollo program is that they didn't have the right organization actually
And I can tell you from our personal experience in the mission control at NASA we had initially when they had the Apollo program , we had back rooms with hundreds
Prior to her tenure with NASA, Newman was the Apollo program professor of Aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT,
This is from Werner Von Braun, the architect of Apollo's-- I'm sorry, NASA's Apollo Program .
So there I've kind of taken to, to likening it to a stealth Apollo program .
But what's amazing is that all this stuff-- you know, we made this decision to stay in Earth orbit a long, long time ago, as the Apollo program was coming
I think it's going to be a function of-- I don't think governments can take the risks anymore that were inherent in the early Apollo program days.
And then, in August of 1968, George Lowe, the director of the Apollo program office,
And I was thinking, having followed the space program for many years and having a lot of knowledge about the Apollo program -- well, what were the most challenging things
And that excitement that every reader-- everybody in the world has some sense, some connection with the Apollo program , even if you were born way afterward.
Then the Apollo program came and that was man it was a Cadillac of the spacecraft.
We never had a problem in the Apollo program going that way so it was kind
In fact this vast web of control and connection only broke down in the Apollo program two times.
And those of you who remember the Apollo program ,
Unfortunately I'm old enough to remember the-the tail end of the Apollo program and I remember Apollo 17
So the first question from someone in Mountainview called John R., he says, "How do you feel about the fact that since the Apollo program ended we've never gone beyond low-low air